We show that in the EU there were diverse causes for the sovereign debt crisis. Yet, scal austerity was hastily imposed assuming that the multiplier would be weak and scal consolidation could quickly be achieved. Yet, it turned out that scal consolidation is state dependent: It is substantially more contractionary if undertaken during a recession than during an expansion. There is no single multiplier for all times. The scal multiplier is regime dependent and depends on the economic environment and business cycle regimes. The success of the multiplier and the debt stabilization depend on nancial stress, credit spreads, the vulnerability of the banking system, monetary policy actions, the state of internal and external demand, exchange rates and so on. Empirical studies are reviewed that have used regime change models and Multi-Regime VARs (MRVARs) to estimate and evaluate state dependent scal and monetary policies. We show that consolidation policies in certain regimes can be strongly contractionary which is replicated in a dynamic model using a new solution method. Furthermore, not only are the contractionary impacts of aggregate scal policy (public expenditure and revenue) to be considered, but also the composition of scal consolidations, aecting health, education, infrastructure, and public consumption, as well as their distrubtuional impacts.
Introduction
Sovereign debt in many countries has been rising since the great recession started in [2007] [2008] . There are many reasons for the rise of sovereign debt and the causes of debt crises are diverse. From 2007 to 2009 the US, the administration has put forward banking bailout and scal stimulus packages. This was followed world-wide, also in many EU countries. But public decit and sovereign debt also rose due to the recessionary eect, due to falling output, income and tax revenues.
The European countries were exposed to other causes of the rise of debt. Some countries had traditionally high sovereign debt, and in some other countries the bail-out of private, real estate and banking debt, led to the public debt increase.
1 In addition, in some European Union countries, the acceleration of sovereign risk created high premia on sovereign bonds, triggering high cost of borrowing and further rise of debt which nally generated debt crises, for example in Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain. Those crises revealed the vulnerable interconnection between sovereign debt, nancial market stress and recessions. Because of those vulnerabilities and an eminent threat to the existence of the EU-zone, the sustainability of sovereign debt has been made an important issue in the EU.
The concern over the sustainability of sovereign debt is not new in the Euro-area, it had been the subject of many debt sustainability studies in earlier times.
2 Until the years 2006/7, many studies had concluded that the debt in the EU is sustainable, see Greiner et al (2005) and Roch and Uhlig (2012) . Recently, many countries, in particular EU-zone member states, have introduced or were steered into policies of scal consolidation and stabilization of sovereign debt. growth rates start declining when the debt to GDP ratio reaches a certain threshold, for example 90 percent as they suggested. What is also underdeveloped are studies that show how scal consolidation actually works in recessionary periods and in a situation of high nancial stress. Since also beyond Europe, austerity and scal consolidation policies have extensively been pursued, it is important to evaluate them. There are now new views on this, even by the IMF, that show evidence that those stabilization policies are not eective and lead to excessive social costs of the adjustment policies.
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In this paper macroeconomic and macroeconometric studies are reviewed and a dynamic model presented to throw some light on those issues. The scal multiplier has become central in those studies.
One view is that the scal multiplier, when public expenditures are reduced or taxes are raised, is too strong, or is asymmetric being stronger in recessions than in expansions 5 in particular in the presence of nancial market stress, so that contractionary eects can become very severe when scal consolidations are pursued. This, for example has been observed in some member states of the EU, where one has experienced, after scal consolidations, falling output and income, rising unemployment, falling tax revenues, and rising decit and sovereign debt, triggering more nancial stress and so on.
To explain this occurrence in the EU, some have modeled this as a multiple equilibria phenomenon.
It is argued that some EU countries may be locked into a bad equilibrium. In this view, economists work with models of expectation dynamics, where a self-fullling prophecy can lead to the situation 1 See Stein (2011) . 2 See the many contributions by Bohn, for example, Bohn (1998), Greiner et al (2005.) and Roch and Uhlig (2012) for a literature review.
3 See the diverse publications of the IMF, for example Blanchard et al (2013a) , Baum et al (2012) and Batini et al (2012) . 4 See again the IMF studies by Blanchard et al (2013a) , Baum et al (2012) and Batini et al (2012) 5 On the asymmetric and size dependent scal multiplier, see Mittnik and Semmler (2012a) that countries end up in a bad equilibrium generated through a self-enforcing mechanism. De Grauwe (2011) has shown that in the Euro-zone there is a danger of such a self-enforcing mechanism. Such a mechanism is likely to work for the EU currency union, but may work dierently for stand-alone countries, for example the US, UK and Japan. In particular, for countries in a loose currency union one might observe such a mechanism (De Grauwe, 2011 ).
Yet, instead of referring to a self-enforcing mechanism, generated through expectation dynamics, one can also show that countries may face a vicious cycle, through nancial markets, where nancial stress and macroeconomic self-enforcing feedback mechanisms can eliminate the usual automatic stabilizers and create strong downward multiplier eects, partly arising from scal consolidation policies undertaken at a wrong time of the business cycle, for example when there are income and credit constraints of agents and nancial market stress.
What will be stressed here are nonlinearities in macroeconomics. Policy eects are not only state dependent, or business cycle dependent, they are also size dependent. This view is related to business cycle studies in the tradition of Keynes, Kalecki, Kaldor, and Goodwin 6 If policies have dierent eects in booms and recessions, wrong policies can create strong contractionary eects in recessions. Since the multiplier studies have become central, we are looking rst at the scal multiplier in econometric regime change models, but then also explore scal and monetary policy under nancial stress. We in particular explore downward pushing forces in an economy under nancial stress that can prevent recoveries and debt stabilization from taking place.
Next we study sovereign debt dynamics using a dynamic macro model. In a rst variant of a model we keep the interest on sovereign debt constant, by assuming that the central banks can suciently decrease interest rates and reduce nancial stress. The interest rates are set by the central bank close to zero, as many recent multiplier studies assume. This can generate a tranquil period where there are large capital gains and an asset price boom, where, however, risk premia are low and net worth is rising. Yet, in this normal period overleveraging can occur. In a second version of the model we let the interest rate be endogenous, reecting risk premia, for example on sovereign indebtedness. When there is a rise in sovereign risk, endogenous risk premia, credit spreads, and strong macroeconomic feedback loops, we can demonstrate the likelihood of higher credit spread, higher indebtedness and falling output.
Those stronger macroeconomic feedback loops are basically working through the nancial market and aggregate demand: Rising nancial stress, rising borrowing cost from capital markets and credit spreads cause aggregate demand to fall. When aggregate demand falls utilization of capacity falls and the lower income generates lower surplus to pay o future liabilities, which in turn create greater credit spreads, lower aggregate demand and so on. 7 In this case, mostly real forces are working, which accelerate downturns possibly creating lock-ins into a bad equilibrium. This in short might be interpreted as a positive feedback mechanism between credit spread and capital utilization 8 which may, however, let the debt stabilization eort fail.
Though our model has some similarities to Hall (2011), Gilchrist and Zabrajsek (2011) , and Woodford (2011), it allows, as in Ernst and Semmler (2012) , to study the credit-macro feedback mechanisms in an multi-period model. It also admits to explore the contractionary eects of private deleveraging and, in the case of public debt, the eects of scal consolidation strategies, as for example, discussed 7 On this mechanisms, see also 8 Many recent DSGE models work with endogenous capital utilization and nancial market, for example cost of capital when issuing bonds; A relationship between capital utilization and the user cost of capital can also be found in Keynes.
(2013a).
As to the solution method, our model will not be solved locally through local linearization about the steady state, as used in DYNARE, but by NMPC, which has recently been developed by Gruene and Pannek (2011) and applied to economic problems in Gruene et al (2013) . This global numerical method allows to approximate the accurate dynamic model by an N-period receding horizon model which will provide us with an approximate solution for the decision and state variables as well as for the value function.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In sect. 2 we review some facts on the EU sovereign debt crisis and scal consolidation policies. In sect. 3, we discuss the empirical methodology and results of econometric multi-regime models. Sect. 4 reviews other empirical studies of similar type.
Sect. 4 explores some implications of the empirical studies in the context of model variants of debt sustainability for regimes of low and high nancial stress. Sect. 5 concludes the paper. The algorithm to solve the dierent model variants is presented in the appendix and more in detail in Gruene et al. 
A First Look at the Empirics
Let us take a rst glance at the empirics of the EU debt crises and the attempts to consolidate the sovereign debt with policies.
The Empirics of Debt Crises
As to sovereign debt data for EU countries we might make some preliminary remarks. Compared to the US, where the debt crisis started in the real estate sector, in the EU the causes of the debt crises are diverse, see Stein (2011) . In Spain and Ireland the sovereign debt crisis has its origin essentially in the private sector, in the real estate sector, and was passed on to the public sector through bank bail outs. Portugal and Greece (and Italy) are other cases, in those countries the sovereign debt was high in earlier times, and was rising after the great recession.
Here then the debt crises ended up in the banking sector.
Originally, the sovereign debt, as compared to US, UK, and Japan, in many EU countries (also in Spain) was lower than outside the EU, but, in some periphery EU countries, the sovereign debt jumped up, see the gures presented in De Grauwe (2011). Why did such a rapid deterioration and contagion in the EU occur? Was the insurance mechanisms in the EU for sovereign debt not working?
What happened is still not fully understood. In spite of a insucient understanding of the actual diversity of the causes of debt, and its sudden jump in some countries, an austerity policy was rapidly enacted and imposed on EU periphery countries. A specic list of austerity measures is given below.
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What was expected? One thought was that austerity reduces, through condence building, interest rates and credit cost for sovereign debt. 
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The IMF had rst predicted a success of the scal consolidation, but if one compares the predictions with the outcome, one can observe that the assumed downward pressure was underestimated and estimated multipliers from the consolidation were too small. The question arose: Were all the painful austerity eorts undertaken because of a computational error? Some recent publications seem to suggest this, see sect. 4 below.
Evidence on Diverse Debt Crises
In the table 1 some trends, based on Stein (2011), 12 are summarized.
One can observe a diversity of debt crisis in Europe.
In some countries, there was rst a rise in real estate debt, then after the real estate crisis the debt was then passed on to the public and it emerged a sovereign debt crisis. This happened, for 10 See IMF (2012), Bolton et al (2011) , and ZEW Index (2012/13), and De Grauwe (2012). 11 See Busch et al (2012) . This of course created a vicious cycle: With the social cost rising and with the spreading of the view that a default should be an option, the default of some countries (for example Greece) became more likely and the cost of borrowing was rising again, bringing the country closer to default.
12 See his tables 1-3 and gures 1-3. Portugal and Greece (and Italy) are dierent cases, in these countries the sovereign debt was high in earlier times, partly already since the 1980s.
The countries with real estate debt were Spain and Ireland and with sovereign debt were Portugal and Greece. The latter two had on average an annual structural imbalance about roughly -4. The same pattern can be observed for Germany. Thus such distinct regimes and high (negative) correlation of industrial production activity and nancial stress in contractions and expansions are also visible for Germany, see gure 2. Next we study the scal consolidation eorts.
Fiscal Consolidation Policies
What one can observe is that, in terms of timing, scal consolidation policies started, 2009/2010, for example in Greece 2010. This occurred in a regime where nancial stress had not receded yet, and production activities were only slowly recovering.
Aggregate eects of EU scal consolidations
The role of austerity policies, which is the attempted decrease in the structural budget decit through scal consolidations, is discussed next, see table 2.
Though in the austerity policies the structural decit 14 was targeted to be reduced. We use here because of the diculty to relate the targeted from the nal eects -the reduction of public consumption as measure for intended scal consolidations. As one can observe in table 2, for the countries considered here the austerity measures did not improve the decit, output gap, debt and employment and also the debt stabilization eect did not occur, but largely the scal and macroeconomic performance of the countries deteriorated.
As the growth declined the impact of growth on the structural decit here measured as average decit for a longer time period showed up in a higher decits, see gure 3.
14 The structural decit is the cyclically adjusted decit, often dened also as scal stance. Fiscal stance=∆spbt;
whereby pbt = spbt + cpbt, and pbt=primary balance, spbt=structural balance, and cpbt=cyclical component. The latter is computed from the output gap, with cpbt= γgapt. But in the subsequent presentation we take 6 year averages as proxy for structural decit. showing that higher decits generate higher bond yields, it also can be seen as conrming the view that higher cost of sovereign borrowing drive up public decits.
Overall, with the consolidation policies enacted, the structural decit did not fall, and the higher decits created higher bond yields driving up again the cost of sovereign debt and with it the decit. This issue will be further discussed below in sect. 5.
Composition of the consolidation programs
Next we want to look at the composition of scal consolidations. It is not only the distinction between public consumption, and public investment, see EU report (2012:165), which is relevant, but also the eects of the austerity on health, education, physical and other infrastructure, as well as public sector wages and salaries if one considers the eect of scal consolidations. Longer-term liquidity provision were provided. In addition to the increase in amount of the longer-term renancing operations (LTRO) with maturities of three and six month, the maturities of the LTRO were temporarily extended to 12 month, later to 3 years, to reduce uncertainty and encourage banks to provide credit to the economy. Furthermore, these measures were expected to contribute to keeping the money market rate at low levels.
The ECB then undertook an expansion of a list of assets eligible as collateral during the nancial crisis, the list of eligible collaterals, accepted in Eurosystem renancing operations, was extended and includes e.g. ABS to enable renancing of illiquid assets though the central bank to overcome liquidity shortages due to sudden halt in interbank lending.
Currency swap agreements were changed. The Eurosystem provides liquidity in foreign currency in cooperation with other central banks at various maturities. This measure supported banks with limited access to foreign currencies, most notably US dollars.
Covered bond purchase programs were undertaken. Instead of accepting the debt securities as collateral, the Eurosystem can also purchase certain assets outright. To revive the covered bond market, the Eurosystem purchased euro-denominated CB issued in the euro-area at a value of 
Methods of Estimating Multi-Regimes
As to estimating multiplier regimes there are currently three dierent methods at the forefront. We here briey will discuss the three methods.
The Markov Regime Switching Model
Many studies employ the Hamilton regime switching model. What is explored here is the probability of recessions.
17 In the light of the extensive criticism of the 90 % threshold of Reinhart and Rogo, this statement might need to be reviewed as well. Hamilton and Lin (1996) The above describes the Markov regime switching method. One might, however, argue, that the regime change results from the entire system dynamics, and one does not know which variable is switching, and which variable to refer to for policy purposes. From the point of view of policy action one might want to know which variable, or variables, move into a precarious territory.
Smooth Transition Regression Model
Another method is the Smooth Transition Regression (STR) model, or in vector form called VSTAR.
A transition function is dened as in gure 6.
The STR or VSTR method is a more practical one using more information on the essential variables.
One in fact can observe the switching variable, or variables. On the other hand, it is limited in terms of the number of variables that can be used to study regime switching.
The Method of a Multi-Regime VAR Another econometric multi-regime model uses pre-dened thresholds of the Tong and Tsay type. This is used by Mittnik and Semmler (2011 , 2012a , 2013 
One uses a pre-dened threshold for a regime change at r (growth or nancial stress regimes) rather than estimating (best-tting) thresholds. The advantage is that it allows for (i) Piecewise In a second regime of decision making, the labor market is not cleared, there are constrained choices, consumption depends on actual employment, and rms`production depends on actual demand. In the recessionary stage, government expenditure is expected to have strong eects. When rms face sales For the high growth regime, on the left, we can observe the output multiplier (upper gure) and the employment multiplier (lower gure) whereby the threshold variable is output growth. Not only does the scal expansion have a stronger eect on growth in the low growth regime, but particularly employment increases signicantly through scal expansion. This is somewhat in contrast to the model by Monacelli et al. (2011) . They argue that labor market tightness, job nding probabilities and separation rate, extensive and intensive margins of work as well as participation rates reduce the employment multiplier signicantly. They do this however not in a two regime model and two regime VAR but in a conventional one regime dynamic model and one regime VAR. For our MRVAR one can clearly observe the state dependence of scal policy eects and thus one would predict a dierent impact of policies on output and employment in the two regimes.
We also want to note that correspondingly, for a budget consolidation, a negative scal shock, one would expect a larger eect on output and employment than in an expansionary period. Though this exercise was not directly undertaken in MS (2012a), the conclusion is justied to make though expansionary eects of scal policies in recessions may generate a slightly dierent multiplier as compared to a scal contraction in recessions. . We rst refer to output as threshold and report a MRVAR, then we refer to nancial stress as variable to dene regimes, nancial stress regimes.
Growth Regimes
Next, results are shown for using output as regime dening variable, as in sect. 3.3. We show here estimation results from Semmler (2011, 2012b ) who study real and nancial shocks in dierent output regimes, in high and low growth regimes. We use the IMF FSI, as discussed in sect.
2.3, as stress variable, and IP, the monthly production index, as real variable for numerous countries.
We here want to particularly focus on the eects of monetary policy, which is perceived more as an unconventional type.
The gures 8-9 for Italy and Spain show us that in a high growth regime, nancial stress reduction creates little growth eects but in a low growth regime expansionary eects on output are quite visible.
On the other hand, one can conclude that stress increase in low growth regimes will have a stronger growth contraction than in high growth regimes. This also means that if there is scal consolidation, and nancial stress rises, the contractionary eects will be rather strong. We also can observe not only asymmetries but also size dependence of shocks: large stress shocks matter more, for details see Mittnik and Semmler (2012a) . Monetary policy needs to very active, and signicant, in order to generate improvements in output. As is visible from gure 11, a positive FSI shock has a strong eect on themselves (upper left) in a high stress regime, and stress shocks negatively aect output (lower left). A negative output shock has in turn a signicant negative eect on nancial stress (upper right). Thus, scal consolidation may run into this vicious cycle as illustrated above: nancial stress increases, and stress reduces output, output contractions can lead to more nancial stress and so on.
A study using the third method above, employing an VSTAR methodology, to determine thresholds in terms of a nancial stress variable and undertaking IR is reported in Schleer and Semmler (2013) using the ZEW nancial stress index. The regimes are dened as stress regimes. The stress regimes are estimated through VSTAR, as discussed in sect. 3.2. The results reported there are for many EU countries. As can be observed there, with the new estimation of the thresholds through VSTAR, the IR show quite expected results for many countries. In a low stress regime, reducing the nancial stress increases output little, whereas a stress increase in a high stress regime generates roughly twice as much output losses than a stress shock in a low stress regime.
Thus output losses of scal contractionary policies are expected to have more negative eects on output if also the nancial stress rises, which in turn will reduce output. In particular when the banks hold sovereign risky bonds, nancial stress is likely to be higher if sovereign risk rises.
21 Thus, in the last years, in the EU, monetary policy faced a strong downward multiplier eect. This appeared to have occurred due to both a contractionary eect through scal consolidation programs but also through the nancial stress in the EU nancial and banking system. Hereby the ECB policy turned out not to be very mitigating.
As summary so far we can state that many studies point to the view that downward pressures occur with scal consolidation arising from: 1) constraints in product markets and constraints in the 22 Next we want to discuss other recent studies and the extent to which they have taken those amplifying mechanism into account.
Other Multiple Regime Studies
There are a number of recent empirical multiple regime studies that are somewhat similar to the ones reported above. For example, as mentioned, De Long and Summers (2012) study the scal multiplier, namely the multiplier in good and bad times. They discuss also the persistent eects of not undertaking scal policy actions in a recession. Fazzari et al. (2012) use an indicator function to estimate thresholds while employing only real variables. As mentioned before, there has also been a considerable change in IMF studies in recent times. These studies also consider that the eects of consolidation eorts are state dependent. 23 We will limit our more detailed discussion to a few important recent quantitative studies on asymmetries of the eects of scal actions in expansions and contractions. Some of the studies show indeed distinctively that the (upfront) scal consolidation in recessions is likely to be contractionary. We discuss here briey four studies.
An important recent study is the one by Blanchard and Leigh (2013). Though the study does not
use a multi-regime model, and does not explicitly take into account the state of the nancial sector, it points to the existence of dierent regimes in a multiplier study. Blanchard and Leigh (2013) regress the forecast error 24 on the forecast in the following way: F orecast Errror of ∆Y i,t:t+1 = α + β F orecast of ∆F i,t:t+1/t + i,t:t+1 with f orecast error = ∆Y i,t:t+1 − f {∆Y i,t:t+1/t |Ω t } Fiscal consolidation is measured as structural decit reduction, as positive number. The result is, for example, that for Greece, Ireland and Portugal there is a β = −0.82 and signicant. This means that a forecast error, due to the actual drop of the GDP growth ∆Y i,t:t+1 , is large and it can essentially be attributed to a large contractionary eect due to a large multiplier.
A dierent multiplier in expansions and contractions is also found in Auerbach et al. (2012a, b).
To estimate the threshold for expansions and recessions they estimate the appropriate regimes with an indicator function. The time periods and the estimated multiplier eects are listed in the table 7, upper part. As can be seen the multiplier eect is always stronger in recessions than in expansions.
The authors study the spending multiplier in expansions and recessions for a number of countries, see When Baum et al (2012) use the output gap it is based on OECD estimates for most countries, for some other countries they take the HP-lter, but nancial stress variables are neglected in their estimates.
As the gure 12 shows the greatest contraction is occurring with an up-front decrease in scal spending when the output gap is negative, followed by a stretched out scal austerity over 2 years. do not take into account asymmetries with respect to the size of shocks and they mostly neglect specic nancial market and banking stress variables when the scal multiplier eect is studied. Also, the interaction of scal and monetary policies, given nancial stress or no nancial stress is not 
A Dynamic Model with Financial Stress Regimes
Next, we will be interested what macro mechanisms might be responsible explaining the success and failure of policies. This is explored in a nonlinear macro model which includes the risk from sovereign debt and nancial stress. we will also focus on whether monetary policy partly osets or mitigates the contractionary pressures from scal consolidations? Furthermore, we will pursue the question whether and to what extent we can track if debt stabilization is possible. 26 The models by BS and MS solely focus on the banking system which borrows to accumulate assets with returns, while there are preferences over payouts, serving as a consumption stream. When leveraging and payouts are less constrained, and nancial stress and risk premia are high, the banking system is vulnerable and more prone to instability. With stronger restrictions, and low interest rates and low credit spreads there is a greater corridor of stability, creating a more stable environment for the banks. On the other hand with less decision constraints, and the banking system facing state dependent risk premia and credit spreads which increases the cost of leveraging of the banks, there is a smaller corridor of stability. 
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In BO (2012) a vicious cycle or diabolic loop can occur where sovereign debt, held by the banking system, can make the banking system unstable exposing it to nancial stress, facing larger credit spreads, and forcing them to cut down on loans, enforcing a downward spiral. See gure 5 in BO (2012) where the feedback eects between sovereign and nancial sector risk give rise to a diabolic loop .
The model presented here refers to two strands of literature. First, to understand the debt issues involved, we refer here to intertemporal models, and thus to multi-period decisions of economic agents.
There are several reasons why the choice of a multiperiod model might be useful:
One needs to track the path of dynamic variables over a longer horizon. The evolution of debt and the sustainability of debt can only be tracked over a longer horizon, though we do not assume an innite horizon here Leveraging and the evolution of debt is frequently seen to be interconnected with asset prices or net worth (see Stein 2011) . To have a multi-period payo function either for consumers or rms,
is essential in asset pricing theory
In an open economy context the issue of current account imbalances and external debt sustainability is crucial, so one also needs a multi-period model to study the long period sustainability
The outcomes of such an intertemporal decision making model can then be compared to standard macro models when one models and estimates policy eects Second, we also want to take into account amplication and macroeconomic feedback loops that have been known in macroeconomics since long but are severely neglected in DSGE models. In Charpe et al 
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A regime dependent loan rate moving counter-cyclically, often described as nancial accelerator (dierent from the interest rate that is following the Taylor rule)
A real loan rate and price expectation eects as developed in Tobin's (1975) work 27 See also Blanchard (2013b) 28 The following macroeconomic feedback eects are well known in the history of macroeconomics, see Charpe et al (2013) 29 They extensively treat the Fisher debt deation eect in their paper, but they also stress the households' deleveraging eect on demand.
Wage channel eects that can trigger amplifying forces when wages are are aected in the regimes (this depends of course on the shape of the Phillips curve and whether the economy is wage led or prot led).
The nancial market and loan rate channel 30 and the wage channel and other forces aecting eective demand are currently likely to be the most important ones in the EU macroeconomics. 31 We mainly explore the credit market-macro link, and to some extent the wage and demand channels, using model variants of low and high nancial stress.
In our context, as we will show, an innite horizon model is not needed, we will solve the model with moving nite horizon by a new numerical procedure, the NMPC method, see appendix and Gruene et al (2013) . This new solution procedure allows for both a multi-period model, but also includes some of well-known macroeconomic feedback and amplication mechanisms.
Regime of Low Financial Stress
In a rst model variant we keep the interest on debt constant and at a low level. This is equivalent to the case of the central bank pursuing a low or near zero interest rate policy. By this, in fact it might attempt to keep the economy in a low nancial stress regime.
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In equ. (1) there is preference over log utility. T does not have to be very large, or go to innity. 33 The policy variables are consumption, and growth rate of capital stock, c t , g t . 34
Equ. (2) represents the capital stock. It increases due to investment but declines due to a capital depreciation rate δ. have a stochastic shock in a Brownian motion and volatility dependent asset prices. We can also admit stochastic shocks occurring along the path, represented by the second term in equ. (2) . This is the only stochastic shock we have built in (though we will neglect this in in our current version when we solve the model). The equ (3) represents the 30 Another self-enforcing mechanism could be that the social cost of austerity lets the fraction of population increase that opts for a sovereign default rather than accepting the severe austerity program which will increase the probability of default. 34 Actually in the numerics we can takec = c/k, so that the rst two choice variables can be conned to reasonable constraints between 0 and 1. dynamics of aggregate debt (households and rms).
which is standard if one allows for external borrowing, see Blanchard and Fischer (1989, ch. 2) .
The interest payment on debt, rb t , increases debt but the surplus(y t − c t − i t − ϕ(g t k t )) negative excess absorption decreases debt through a surplus. Hereby we have i = g t k t . Note that since consumption and investment are separate policy variables we allow here for external borrowing. Moreover, ϕ(g t k t ) is the adjustment cost for investment. Overall the model has two decision variables and two state variables. Note that we have quadratic adjustment cost of investment and we could permit a dierence of interest and discount rates.
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Note also that we could allow here the income y to be split up into y = normal return on capital + capital gains + wage income.
37 Then the excess return on capital income over the interest rate, generated through capital gains, can be used to service the debt, see Stein (2011) . This can hold as long as there is no risk premium included in the interest being paid. Low interest rates and capital gains are frequently highly negatively correlated.
38 This is a kind of Minsky scenario where nancial fragility may arise in a period of tranquility and thus low or zero risk premia can be observed, as for example were seen in teh US from the 1990s to 2007. Implicitly, in this case, on the asset side, as
Stein (2011) shows, the present value of the assets will tend to become very large, because there is no correction through a risk premium, 39 as it should be, 40 and capital gains help to service the debt. Now we solve our above model by using NMPC. Assuming here r = 0.04, δ = 0.07 and quadratic adjustment cost of investment, we obtain the following solutions using NMPC, yet, setting the shock equal to zero.
The vertical axis shows the debt to capital stock ratio, the horizontal is the capital stock. 
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Whereas the gure 13 represents the solution paths for two dierent initial conditions, but the same discount and interest rate, the next example assumes that the central bank is able to reduce the discount rate and interest rate through monetary instruments to r = 0.02. The results of the NMPC solution are shown in gure 14, the solutions starting with initial conditions k(0) = 0.9, b(0) = 0.9. 37 Note that the capital gains could be positive or negative. If positive over a longer time period, as asset price models propose, see Stein (2011) , that is often accompanied by redistribution of labor income to dividend income. 38 This could be observed in the US during the real estate boom where one could observe low interest rates, low risk premia and low discount rates. Low discount rates in turn generate high asset prices and capital gains, Chen and Semmler (2012).
39 Stein (2011) suggests then to make corrections by suggesting to take the trends/drifts in capital gains and interest rates in such a model, that would better measure some debt capacity. The borrowing exceeding that debt capacity would amount to excess borrowing 40 See also Chen and Semmler (2012) on the relation of risk premia and asset pricing. 41 This is consistent with the case put forward by Bohn (1998) that the debt is mean reverting when the reaction coecient (the response of the surplus with respect to sovereign debt) in his debt dynamics is greater than the interest rate. In his case however the interest rate is a constant, or only slightly varying through the growth rate of marginal utilities, if he takes the latter to determine the discount rate. As can be observed from gure 14, if the central bank is able to move the discount and interest rate down 42 from to r = 0.04 to r = 0.02, the simulation shows that the path of the leverage ratio, measured as debt over capital stock, starting out of the steady state, is lower for r = 0.02 (lower   graph) 43 than for the discount and interest rate r = 0.04 (upper graph). Yet the steady states are roughly the same. Here again there are stable scenarios, as long as there are no risk premia or the risk premia are very low, so that possible capital gains can be used for servicing the debt, debt eventually stabilizes about a nite ratio and nancial stress is low.
In this rst model variant we have kept the interest rate on sovereign debt persistently low, by assuming that the central banks can suciently reduce interest rates, and reduce credit spreads and nancial stress, and avoid instability of the banking system. The interest rate is kept constant there-
after. Yet, this may generate a tranquile period where there are larger capital gains and an asset price boom, where, risk premia are low and asset prices rising. Yet, when an overleveraging occurs and the bubble bursts and capital gains become negative, then net worth maybe rapidly deteriorating. As the debt ratio rises and the capital gains fall, and interest rates and credit spreads rise the latter being negatively correlated with the capital gains net worth of the assets can quickly vanish.
44 State dependent interest rates and credit spreads are discussed next.
Regime of High Financial Stress
Next, we allow not only the yields on bonds, sovereign or private (measured against the German Bund) to be endogenous, but we permit also endogenous feedback loops of leveraging and bond yields on output and other macroeconomic variables, 45 possibly giving rise to a stage of high nancial stress and vulnerability of banks. This is equivalent to the central bank not attempting, or not being able, to pursue an unconventional monetary policy to bring down credit spreads and nancial stress.
The dierence to the model of sect. 5.1 is now rst that we assume that there are risk premia and the bond yields is a nonlinear function of the debt to capital stock ratio. We may dene nancial stress by a risk premium driven credit spread r(b t /k t ) by using a proxy such as an arctan-function:
42 This simulation is similar to the case of many studies that discuss the monetary policy performance with zero interest rate bounds, see Gavin et al (2013) . We here allow the discount and interest rate to go down to 0.02. Gavin et al.
point also to some dangers if the central banks hold the interest too long close to the zero bounds, thought they do not consider the improved sustainability of sovereign debt due to near zero interest rates.
43
The economic implications of an interest rate held close to the zero bounds are considered in Gavin et al (2013) .
They argue that deationary pressures may arise with zero interest rates. 44 For details of such a scenario, see Stein (2011 47 Here, the interest payment on bonds rises with the debt to capital stock ratio, rst slowly, then more rapidly but is nally bounded. We here have set β = 0.1. Now if we were to look at the asset side of the economy, asset prices are likely to fall or not grow any more and capital gains could become negative. So if the possible capital gains shrink, they cannot be used for debt service, on the contrary, surpluses would shrink, debt service rise and debt sustainability becomes threatened.
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Moreover, in addition to this dierence to the model of sect. 5.1, we here make not only the credit spread a nonlinear function of the debt to capital stock ratio but there is also an endogenous eect of this on aggregate demand. There are now endogenous risk premia, interest rates and utilization of capacity eects. Empirically, these are important macroeconomic feedback loops that one often can observe during periods of nancial stress, as for example listed above, see also Hall (2010) .
We can make the actual consumption and investment demand depending on credit spread, triggered by rising yields on risky credit and bonds.
49 Then we would have for consumption and investment demand:
with the derivatives df
Though optimal consumption and investment plans are chosen, actual consumption and investment decline due to rising risk premia, credit spread and nanciel stresss. So, overall we may have :
where again du
and then we can refer to the rising credit spread and nancial stress as triggering a self-enforcing mechanism reducing output and capacity utilization. The latter is due to lower consumption and investment demand. If capacity utilization falls, income, and thus tax revenue, as well as capital gains and the surplus, to service the debt, fall. This might make then debt -and bond issuing, if bonds are sold on the market unsustainable, because of further jumps in credit spreads or even credit rationing.
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More generally, the stronger macroeconomic feedback loops 51 may arise because of the following:
46 Presenting there EU debt and bond yield data. 47 Note that the above function of equ. (7), has the same shape as the STR function as shown in gure 6. Because of better properties of (7) in the numerics we use (7) instead of the STR function as in gure 6. In DSGE models the rise of risk premia is often modeled through persistent shocks, see Gilchrist et al (2011) , and see also Semmler and Bernard (2012 50 A model with credit constraints is treated in Ernst and Semmler (2012) . Yet one might also face insolvencies of banks, in the period of high nancial stress, as discussed in sect. 2 and 3, which would amplify the above described contraction.
51 A systematic study of macroeconomic feedback eect, know from the history of macroeconomics, partly stabilizing partly destabilizing, are extensively discussed in Charpe et al (2013) There is the wealth eect reducing aggregate demand when the capital appreciation falls, or becomes negative, both consumption and investment demand are likely to fall Whereas the rst three destabilizing mechanisms have been known in the literature and are often viewed to generating a vicious cycle, the last one, which has recently been discussed, adds a more dangerous mechanism which has been called diabolic loop.
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Next we are undertaking two exercises. First we are setting the macro feedback loops to be very weak. We get the result as demonstrated by the right graph, in gure 15. As the solution path for the capital stock and leveraging in gure 15 shows, right graph, the lower interest payments on government bonds rst admits a higher capital stock and higher leveraging. Yet as the interest rates in our case the risky bond yields reach a certain threshold, we observe that with an increasing leveraging and sovereign risk and risk premia, capital stock stops rising but the leverage ratio is rising further. This is occurring when in the credit spread is moving beyond a certain threshold. So here then nally there is unsustainable debt since the interest payments become higher than the surplus to service the debt, as the equ. (6) indicates.
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Next we increase the strength of the macroeconomic feedback loops. We expect, starting with a debt to capital stock ratio roughly above normal, that the above feedback mechanisms lead to higher nancial market stress and higher risk yields, higher credit spreads and lower output leading to a 52 The share of those households matte, since there is empirical evidence that the drop in demand will be larger for households with larger debt, that are forced to deleverage more, see Eggertsson and Krugman (2011 contraction in the utilization of the capital stock, and capital stock itself, and to an increasing debt to capital stock ratio.
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The debt dynamics with endogenous credit spread and endogenous output and surplus of system (4)-(6) and (7)-(9) are shown in gure 15, left graph, again using the NMPC solution method. A situation is sketched here where the central bank cannot or is not authorized to bring down the risk premia and credit spreads through asset market interventions. Figure 15 shows, starting with a debt to capital stock ratio of roughly unity, the feedback mechanisms of higher risk premia and higher yields, higher credit spreads and lower output leading to a contraction of capital stock and to a rapidly increasing debt to capital stock ratio, left graph.
60 Again, the right graph represents the case where there are only weak macro feedback loops, as discussed above.
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Note that the usual build-in stabilizer the rising public decit and the multiplier eects of 60 Note that a strong contractionary eect could also occur if the creditors become unwilling to lend when a certain debt to GDP ratio is reached and new borrowing or rolling over of old debt will be discontinued. For a model including such a sudden rise of credit market constraint, see Ernst and Semmler (2012 62 Given those above sketched macro feedback loops it is easily explained why there might be a regime switch from a low to a high stress regime where vulnerabilities increase and a faster deterioration of the economy occurs.
Debt stabilization might work under the condition spelled out in sect. 5.1. and it also might temporally work under the condition shown in the right graph in gure 15. Yet, with a larger jump in the risk premia (and discount rate), responding to higher leveraging, with lower net worth, due to capital gains falling, a vulnerable banking system, and central banks failing to undertake an unconventional intervention into asset markets, the strong macro feedback loops are likely to be operating and debt stabilization is likely not to be achieved, as shown in the left graph of gure 15.
Conclusions
We have shown that in the EU there was a diversity of debt and nancial stress dynamics; being dierent for Ireland and Spain, and Portugal and Greece (the rst suering from excess private debt, the second from public debt). We have stressed that there was no single multiplier for all times. The multiplier eect is state dependent and depends on the economic environment and regimes. Given the experience with the state dependent scal multiplier presumably one needs to rethink the Keynesian multiplier theory as it is presented in text books.
63 Also, the success of debt stabilization depends then on regimes and the economic environment on the nancial stress and the vulnerability of the banking system, monetary policy actions, the state of internal and external demand, exchange rates and so on.
Stressing the role of nancial stress, we have shown that a regime switch from low to high nancial stress might occur. We have focused on empirical studies that have employed regime change models and MRVARs for estimating scal and monetary policy eects. As in Eggertsson and Krugman (2011) our model suggests that government spending should have a large expansionary eect on output at zero or near zero interest rates, but in contrast to them we stress that monetary policy needs be able likely to be strongly contractionary if there is beside severe labor market and product constraints also signicant nancial stress and a vulnerability of the banking system.
We have shown that composition eects of consolidations are also important. Not only are aggregate expenditures and taxes relevant, but also the composition of scal consolidation: health education, infrastructure, public consumption.
64 Whether the scal multiplier will trigger positive long run eects depends also signicantly on productivity of public investments (health, education, infrastructure, public consumption).
65 The hastily enacted EU austerity programs had, and still have, distributional eects and are likely to endanger the future of the EU Welfare State, see Boyer (2012) and Busch et al. (2012) . Also, with the high social cost of austerity the willingness to default might rise, making default more likely.
Yet one must note that in practice the actual policy was signicantly modied through policy diversity and in particular popular responses (social unrest and strikes in many concerned countries), but also through EU ex-post policy responses. There are now many policy institutions, IMF and EU voices that point to the dangers and limits of too fast consolidation policies.
A response that many politicians in the EU now call for as a new component of a decit consolidation strategy is to pursue more structural and labor market reforms to increase competitiveness and reestablish scal and current account balances in the EU. But one might hesitate to recommend this path in the current environment: As one has observed, there are adverse eects on the labor markets if structural and labor market reforms are swiftly pursued. An example is Germany, where in fact now a dual labor market has been developed, one labor market segment with longer-term labor market contracts and one segment with short-term contracts and a volatile employment situation, see For the numerical solution of the dynamic decision problem we do not apply here the dynamic programming (DP) approach as . Though DP method has the advantage that a global solution to the optimal control problem can be found, by rst computing an approximation to the optimal value V and then the optimal control at each grid point, and its time path. For a detailed description of the specics of the DP algorithm we refer to Gruene and Semmler (2004) . The main disadvantage of DP, however, is that its numerical eort typically grows exponentially with the dimension of the state variable. Hence, even for moderate state dimensions it may be impossible to compute a solution with reasonable accuracy.
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A remedy to this problem can be obtained by using nonlinear model predictive control (NMPC).
Instead of computing the optimal value function for all possible initial states, NMPC only computes single (approximate) optimal trajectories. In order to describe the method, let us abstractly write the optimal decision problem as maximizeˆ∞ 0 e −ρt (x(t), u(t))dt, where x(t) satisesẋ(t) = f (x(t), u(t)), x(0) = x 0 and the maximization takes place over a set of admissible control functions. By discretizing this problem in time, we obtain an approximate discrete time problem of the form maximize
where the maximization is now performed over a sequence u i of control values and the sequence x i satises x i+1 = Φ(h, x i , u i ), Here h > 0 is the discretization time step, β = e −ρh and Φ is a numerical scheme approximating the solution ofẋ(t) = f (x(t), u(t)) on the time interval [ih, (i + 1)h]. For details and references in which the error of this discretization is analyzed we refer to Gruene and Semmler (2004) .
The idea of NMPC now lies in replacing the maximization of the innite horizon functional (12) by the iterative maximization of nite horizon functionals maximize N k=0 β i (x k,i , u k,i ),
for a truncated nite horizon N ∈ N with x k+1,i = Φ(h, x k,i , u k,i ) and the index i indicates the number of the iteration, cf. the algorithm below. Note that neither β nor nor Φ changes when passing from (12) to (13) , only the optimization horizon is truncated.
Problems of type (13) Given an initial value x 0 , an approximate solution of (12) can now be obtained by iteratively solving (13) as follows:
(1) for i=1,2,3,. . .
solve (13) with initial value x 0,i := x i and denote the resulting optimal control sequence by u * k,i
set u i := u * 0,i and x i+1 := Φ(h, x i , u i ) (4) end of for-loop
This algorithm yields an innite trajectory x i , i = 1, 2, 3, . . . whose control sequence u i consists of all the rst elements u * 0,i of the optimal control sequences for the nite horizon subproblems.
Under appropriate assumptions on the problem, it can be shown that the solution (x i , u i ) (which depends on the choice of N in (13)) converges to the optimal solution of (12) as N → ∞. The main requirement in these assumptions is the existence of an optimal equilibrium for the innite horizon problem (12) . If this equilibrium is known, it can be used as an additional constraint in (13) , in order to improve the convergence properties.
However, recent results have shown that without a priory knowledge of this equilibrium this convergence can also be ensured, see Gruene (2012) , and this is the approach we use in the computations in this paper. It should be noted that the references just cited treat averaged instead of discounted innite horizon problems. However, we conjecture that the main proofs carry over to the discounted case details of which will be addressed in future research. In any case, the solution generated by NMPC will always provide a lower bound for the true optimal solution. The procedure also allows for irregular impacts on the dynamics of the state variables and regime switches. 
